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MARTIN DE LA IGLESIA (HAMBURG) 
The popularity of works of art 
Abstract 
This text reviews different notions of popularity in scholarly literature through time, and 
groups them into broader definitions on the one hand, which define popularity as a 
combination of esteem and fame (»well-liked by many people«), and narrower definitions on 
the other hand, for which certain characteristics (e.g. low quality, or a lower-class audience) 
are essential. Although broader definitions are more intuitive and less complex, narrower 
definitions have always been predominant in scholarly literature. However, if popularity is 
seen as a property of a work of art that can exist in varying degrees, rather than a category 
to which an object can either belong or not, it can be applied in its broader sense to any work 
of art. 
 
<1> 
»Nobody likes him, which is weird, because he's famous. How can you be famous if nobody 
likes you?«, says Jess, one of the protagonists of Nick Hornby's 2005 novel A Long Way 
Down, about another character. For Jess, to be famous and to be well-liked seem to be 
somehow connected with each other. However, Jess's thoughts continue: »but all sorts of 
people seem to be famous even though they have no fans. Tony Blair is a good example.« 
So Jess acknowledges that fame and esteem are not inextricably linked. And yet, her initial 
statement betrays an intuitive notion that, more often than not, there is a connection between 
the two. 
<2> 
This is a common notion: things are often found to be both well-liked and well-known. If they 
are, they are usually called popular. Many encyclopedias and dictionaries support this 
definition of popularity, e.g. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913): »Popularity 
[…] 1. The quality or state of being popular; especially, the state of being esteemed by, or of 
being in favor with, the people at large; good will or favor proceeding from the people; as, the 
popularity of a law, statesman, or a book.«1 Not only do we consider this the most basic and 
intuitive definition of popularity, but also a quite useful one to operationalize for scholarly 
ends, as we will show later. This definition, however, is far from uncontested. To defend it, 
this article was written. 
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<3> 
A second, slightly different definition is also found in most reference works, including 
Webster's, which goes on: » 2..The quality or state of being adapted or pleasing to common, 
poor, or vulgar people; hence, cheapness; inferiority; vulgarity.« These are actually two 
different variants of a definition: one saying that the popular object is actively made popular 
(»adapted to common people«), and the other that the object simply is passively liked 
(»pleasing to common people«). Both variants have in common that, in addition to the fame 
and esteem in the first definition, another quality is introduced: whereas in definition 1 it 
doesn't matter which kind of people like the popular object, as long as they are many, the 
recipients in definition 2 are »common, poor, or vulgar«. From the specific qualities of the 
recipients, specific qualities of the popular object are derived: »cheapness; inferiority; 
vulgarity«. The exact wording of the qualities of recipients and objects varies from source to 
source, but the important point is that they are - according to those sources - considered 
essential to the existence of popularity. 
<4> 
It is curious that this second definition of popularity, despite its being less intuitive and more 
complex, dominates most of the scholarly discourse in the arts and humanities. (Notions of 
popularity in psychology and the social sciences, which mostly deal with persons rather than 
objects, are not considered in this article.) For reasons of simplicity and clarity, we will call 
the first definition of popularity the ›broader definition‹ and the second the ›narrower 
definition‹ in the following course of this text. Both have existed alongside each other for 
centuries, but the first important theorization of popularity in a scholarly context (or, to be 
more precise, in literary criticism) didn't happen until the late 18th century, in the debate 
between the German poets Friedrich von Schiller and Gottfried August Bürger.2 Its central 
question was whether literature could be made to appeal to all readers, regardless of their 
social class, or if literature inevitably would suffer in quality if it was made to appeal to the 
allegedly simple taste of the lower classes. Bürger advocated the notion of popularity 
regardless of class, whereas for Schiller, popularity always meant to cater to the common 
people. Judging from the scholarly literature that followed from then up to the present, 
Schiller had won the debate, the narrower definition of popularity had prevailed over the 
broader, and the concept of the division of art into ›high‹ and ›low‹ had been carved in stone. 
<5> 
For instance, in an essay from 1912, Brian Hooker even draws a line between »popular 
fiction« and »culture«.3 Although he admits that »wherever there is admiration, something is 
admirable«, popular art is linked to inferior quality for him - a »lapse of taste«. Likewise, R. A. 
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Scott-James, in an essay from 1913, divides the reading public into classes (of taste, not 
explicitly social classes) and provides the means by which an author can achieve popularity 
among them: sensationalism, sentimentality, eroticism, humor, and morality, respectively.4 »It 
is useless to name as a sixth class those who are moved by intellectual ideas, for so small a 
class is not the objective of the popular author.« It is not far-fetched to recognize the 
»common people« of the narrower definition of popularity in the first five of Scott-James' 
classes, who form the quantitative majority of the reading public, but whose taste is vulgar. 
<6> 
In his text from the 1940s on »Popular Art«, Lyman Bryson only seemingly follows a broader, 
quantitative definition of popularity when he says, »by popular art we mean creative work that 
measures success by the size of its audience and the profit it brings to its makers«.5 
However, not all creative work qualifies as popular art: »we can begin by distinguishing the 
popular from the other kinds. I would suggest that there are three categories of which popular 
art is one. The other two are fine art and folk art.« What distinguishes popular art from fine 
art, according to Bryson, is not its respective audience, but its quality. Popular art cannot be 
»great or fine«. »Fine art can be made more popular if the right devices can be found,« but 
»it would remain something different from popular art.« Vice versa, »this is [...] very different 
from the effort to make popular art into something esthetically fine. That attempt is 
dangerous; the pseudo-fine is the worst of all the art varieties.« 
<7> 
In contrast, a perception of class difference is expressed most patronisingly in an essay from 
1955 by Norman E. Nelson, who suggests that »we« as »medium highbrows« should spend 
more time »looking down at what people around us are actually reading«.6 Nelson is careful 
not to overtly condemn popular arts altogether: »the distinction between art and popular art 
is, in my opinion, a specious one«. However, Nelson expresses his unease of the »captive 
public« being flooded with »stuff hastily worked up«, with »entertainment aimed at the lowest 
common denominator«. Popular art, according to Nelson, »appeals to so many people, not 
merely the hopelessly ›common‹«, but all of them have the same »defect« that »they have 
not taken time out to cultivate a taste for Joyce, Eliot, Bartok, and Picasso.« So here we have 
again a narrow, pejorative notion of popularity. 
<8> 
Another narrow definition is used by James Steel Smith, who uses a slightly different class 
distinction factor and emphasizes qualitative differences. In an essay from 1957, he focuses 
on popular poetry, which »shares its principal and unchanging characteristics with popular 
creations in other arts - popular music, popular art, popular philosophy, movies, mass-
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circulation popular fiction.«7 Smith describes the audience of popular art as »businessmen, 
housewives, mechanics, ministers, lawyers, politicians, and other types of people who may 
be taken as representative of popular, unscholarly taste«, because certain »attitudes cut 
across economic classes, vocations, educational levels.« Smith goes on more precisely: 
»The popular poet is read, liked, and used by non-professionals - that is, by persons whose 
jobs are not directly connected with the making and evaluating of poetry«. So Smith's popular 
public is not necessarily the »common people«. However, Smith doesn't follow the broad 
definition of popularity either, because popularity for him is more than a question of quantity 
and esteem: »the difference is not simply a matter of many readers and few readers or 
›poorer poetry‹ and ›better poetry.‹ Certainly one has more readers, and there is probably 
not much question that there is a difference in quality when the two kinds of poetry cover the 
same territory, but it also becomes plain that ›popular‹ poetry is a separate sphere, with 
identifying characteristics of its own.« Smith lists many of these characteristics of popular 
poetry and other popular arts (e.g. »highly abstract«, »standardized«, »simplified«, 
»orthodoxy in form and content«, »pleased passiveness and absence of rebellion«, 
»optimistic mood«), and finds these elements are »not really few and closely linked«. 
<9> 
Similar points are made in Abraham Kaplan's 1966 essay on »The Aesthetics of the Popular 
Arts«.8 Although Kaplan acknowledges that there is a »straightforward sense« of the word 
»popular«, in which it means »widely read« (referring to books as an example here), his 
focus is on popularity in another sense: »the kind of taste that the popular arts satisfy, and 
not how widespread that taste is, is what distinguishes them. On this basis, I provisionally 
identify my subject as midbrow art, to be contrasted with what appeals to either highbrow or 
lowbrow tastes.« So, interestingly, Kaplan doesn't directly associate popular art with »the 
common people«, but nevertheless it is tied to the presumed taste of a specific demographic, 
the »middle class«. Like Norman E. Nelson, Kaplan criticizes this taste by his thesis »that 
popular art is not the degradation of taste but its immaturity«. Like James Steel Smith, 
Kaplan undertakes a lengthy exploration of the characteristic qualities of popular art, which 
are largely the same (e.g. »standardized«, »simplified«, »stereotyped«, »intolerance of 
ambiguity«, »shallow«, »sentimental«). 
<10> 
In the following years and decades, the discourse on popularity became more scholarly in 
character, perhaps not unconnected to the emergence of cultural studies as an academic 
discipline, and the institutionalization of popular culture studies, above all with the founding of 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham in 1964. An early example of a 
›Birmingham School‹ text is the book The Popular Arts by Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel.9 
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In this book, its authors don't offer a straightforward definition of popular art. Like Abraham 
Kaplan, they see popular art as a category in between fine art and something even lower in 
quality than popular art - the products of the mass media, which they call »art« only in 
quotation marks.10 The distinction between these three kinds of art is based vaguely on 
quality. However, Hall and Whannel briefly mention some specific intrinsic properties of 
popular art: a »substructure of the popular« that uses »popular attitudes« and »popular 
forms«.11 This is a very tentative concept of popularity, though, and the authors emphasize 
that the borders between their three kinds of art are permeable - popular art may evolve 
towards high art or decline into mass art12 -, and that it becomes increasingly hard to draw 
the lines between them.13 
<11> 
In his influential entry on popularity in his book Keywords, first published in 1976, Raymond 
Williams interestingly acknowledges that »the predominant modern meaning« of popularity is 
»›widely favoured‹ or ›well-liked‹«.14 However, according to Williams, this meaning »contains 
a strong element of setting out to gain favor, with a sense of calculation that has not quite 
disappeared but that is evident in a reinforced phrase like deliberately popular«. 
Furthermore, it still carries the older sense of »inferior kinds of work«. »In many cases, the 
earlier senses overlap« with »the more modern sense of well-liked by many people«. From 
this perspective, both the broader and the narrower definition of popularity exist side by side. 
Neither is more correct or better than the other, and scholars may choose which meaning 
they prefer to work with. And yet, as I have already said earlier in this article, most scholars 
reject the broader meaning of »well-liked by many people«. 
<12> 
Let us consider, for example, another text by the aforementioned Stuart Hall, in which he first 
reproduces what we have called the broader definition of popularity: »Next, I want to say 
something about ›popular‹. The term can have a number of different meanings: not all of 
them useful. Take the most common-sense meaning: the things which are said to be 
›popular‹ because masses of people listen to them, buy them, read them, consume them, 
and seem to enjoy them to the full.«15 To this definition, however, Hall adds a pejorative twist: 
»this is the ›market‹ or commercial definition of the term: the one which brings socialists out 
in spots. It is quite rightly associated with the manipulation and debasement of the culture of 
the people.« Hall introduces a second, supposedly superior definition: »The second definition 
of ›popular‹ is easier to live with. This is the descriptive one. Popular culture is all those 
things that ›the people‹ do or have done. This is close to an ›anthropological‹ definition of the 
term: the culture, mores, customs and folkways of ›the people‹.« This definition comes close 
to the narrower definition that associates popularity with the ›common people‹, although Hall, 
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using »the people« only in quotes, does not qualify them as common or otherwise. Anyway, 
Hall rejects his second definition too, because of the difficulty of drawing the line between 
what counts as popular culture and what doesn't, and between »the people« and »not of the 
people«. He then takes the latter issue and makes it the center of a third definition, which he 
approves of: 
<13> 
»So I settle for a third definition of ›popular‹, though it is a rather uneasy one. This looks, in 
any particular period, at those forms and activities which have their roots in the social and 
material conditions of particular classes; which have been embodied in popular traditions and 
practices. […] what is essential to the definition of popular culture is the relations which 
define ›popular culture‹ in a continuing tension (relationship, influence and antagonism) to 
the dominant culture. […] Its main focus of attention is the relation between culture and 
questions of hegemony.« 
<14> 
Like the popularity definition that we have termed narrow, Hall's definition is class-specific, 
but this class-specificity is not negative (»vulgar«, »inferior« etc.), but rather neutral or, from 
Hall's Marxist perspective, even positive (anti-hegemonic). This definition is certainly of 
interest for any scholar working with the political or social aspects of popular culture. 
However, from a more general perspective, the question is whether this definition really 
defines what the ›popularity‹ of popular culture is (Hall uses the term »the popular« instead 
of »popularity«), or if it deals with other aspects of what could also be called ›mainstream 
culture‹ or ›mass culture‹. 
<15> 
Stuart Hall's political definition of popularity was taken up and put more pointedly by Tony 
Bennett, who rejects the broader definition of »well-liked by many people«, because it is 
necessary to define what »people« means here.16 »In one sense, ›the people‹ consists of 
everyone,« says Bennett. »After all, we're all people, aren't we? In another sense, [...] ›the 
people‹ may be equated with the working class.« Bennett explains his notion of »the people« 
like this: »The point is not to define ›the people‹ but to make them, to make that construction 
of ›the people‹ which unites a broad alliance of social forces in opposition to the power bloc 
count politically by winning for it a cultural weight and influence which prevails above others.« 
If we equate Bennett's »power bloc« with Hall's »dominant culture«, their notions of 
popularity are quite similar. At around the same time, however, another, thought-provoking 
definition of popularity was proposed by Roger Chartier. According to Chartier, the popularity 
of objects comes from neither their intrinsic properties nor from the audience who perceives 
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them, but from the way in which they are perceived.17 Popular reading is a kind of 
appropriation which differs from »learned reading« in that, for example, the popular reader 
segments the text into autonomous units that take on an independent meaning, radicalizes 
the meanings of the text, takes metaphors literally etc. It is a kind of perception that lacks 
distance to its object, that isn't aware of the artificiality of its object, whereas the learned 
reader recognizes literary techniques as such and uses his literary knowledge to assess the 
object in terms of genre and status. Any object may be perceived in a popular and a learned 
way, which makes this definition seem broad and liberal. However, although Chartier 
characterizes popular reading as »original«, one cannot help but find Chartier's popular 
reader a rather negatively portrayed figure, who only adopts an original way of reading 
because lack of knowledge prevents him or her to choose another way. Thus, implicitly, 
Chartier presents another narrow definition, in which popularity is assigned to the common 
people. In any case, it is curious that his approach does not seem to have been received by 
many other scholarly texts on popularity. 
<16> 
An article from 1991 by Achim Barsch, for instance, presents a similar reception-based 
definition of popularity, albeit apparently independently from Roger Chartier.18 The difference 
is that Barsch suggests to classify readers and to examine their attitudes towards literature 
as a group, in contrast to the analysis of the individual reader in Chartier's text. In a more 
recent example, Rudolf Helmstetter deals with Chartier's definition directly, but adds to that 
characteristic properties of the production of popular objects (»product of industry- and 
media-based poetics«) and their content (»fun«, following Lawrence Grossberg and Urs 
Stäheli, both of which will be dealt with later in this text).19 Apart from that, content-based 
popularity definitions in the vein of James Steel Smith and Abraham Kaplan continue to be 
published in the following years and decades, e.g. in an article by Hans-Jürgen Ketzer from 
1987, who, discussing Gottfried August Bürger's notion of popularity, decidedly rejects the 
broad (»quantitative«) definition of popularity and names intrinsic characteristics like 
stereotyping and the »stimulation of social well-being«.20 
<17> 
Definitions of popularity with a political emphasis, like the ones by Stuart Hall and Tony 
Bennett, also continue to be offered. Morag Shiach, for example, examines the dynamic 
history of the term »popular«, and expresses her concern with the term »common people« 
shifting towards more neutral terms like »the general public« or »the audience«.21 Shiach 
comments the results of this process as »untheorized« and only »seemingly egalitarian«, 
and advocates the consideration of the negative meaning of »popular« with its implications of 
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»social hierarchy«, »differential power«, »calculated manipulation« and »the relations 
between social power, political democracy and cultural production«.22 
<18> 
In the same tradition, I would place John Fiske. However, Fiske's notion of popular culture 
combines elements from all four narrower popularity definitions I have presented so far - the 
political, the content-based, the audience-based, and even Roger Chartier's reception-based 
approach - and is therefore of particular interest here. In his book Understanding Popular 
Culture, Fiske claims that »popular culture always has a progressive potential«, although 
»the politics of popular culture are full of contradictions, and [...] some of them, under some 
historical and social conditions, may be reactionary«.23 Fiske emphasizes that »popular 
culture is progressive, not revolutionary. Radical art forms that oppose or ignore the 
structures of domination can never be popular [...]«.24 Still, the pleasures and meanings 
derived from popular culture are »resistant« and in opposition to »hegemonic ones«.25 This 
clearly shows Fiske's interest in the political dimension of popular culture that he shares with 
Stuart Hall and others, but also a parallel to Roger Chartier, in that Fiske allows one and the 
same object to be perceived in different ways, a popular/resistant way and a hegemonic way 
that is »preferred by the text«. The prerequisite for this ability to be read in multiple ways is a 
certain characteristic property of popular culture: »semiotic richness«, or »semiotic 
productivity« - popular culture is »polysemic«.26 Additionally, a popular object has to »offer 
points of pertinence through which the experience of everyday life can be made to resonate 
with it« in order to have »relevance«, and it has to have »flexibility of the mode of 
consumption«. Finally, Fiske's approach is also class-specific: he assigns popular art (or 
popular readings) to the »working class«, and distinguishes it from the »art forms and cultural 
tastes« of the »bourgeoisie«.27 
<19> 
John Fiske's notion of popular culture and popular art is perhaps the most comprehensive 
within what we have called the narrower definitions of popularity. From this point in time (the 
late 1980s) onwards, there haven't been many innovative approaches to define popularity. 
Four exceptions shall be mentioned briefly, because they don't fit into either the broader 
popularity definition (»well-liked by many people«) nor into one of the presented narrower 
ones. In 1988, Dick Hebdige suggested »a set of generally available artefacts« as a 
definition of popular culture.28 This definition is persuasively simple, but it is also somewhat 
counter-intuitive: just because, for example, a television show is made generally available by 
being aired on a nationwide channel at prime time, it is not necessarily popular with the 
audience (although its chances to become popular are better than on a regional channel late 
at night). Another approach is presented in a book on children's literature from 1995, in which 
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John Elwall Foster, Ern J. Finnis and Maureen Nimon introduce a distinction between »true 
›popular literature‹« with few literary qualities, and »literature that is popular« with more 
literary qualities.29 However, »literature that is popular« is only a category in between 
»popular literature« and »better quality literature«. »Literature that is popular« still shares 
with »popular literature« characteristics like »dependence upon formula«, 
»commercialization« and »evidence of actual popularity«. Thus, the introduction of a 
category of »literature that is popular« isn't really a useful contribution to a theory of 
popularity. A quite different approach is used by Manuel Braun, who, at least within the 
context of his text, uses a concept of popularity without implications of esteem or 
appreciation.30 His example is the reception of Martin Luther, who was »popular« also with 
his enemies in the sense that they discussed his ideas. This is a quite counter-intuitive 
perspective, and it seems as if Braun, like Jess in Nick Hornby's novel, confuses popularity 
with simple fame or notoriety. Finally, Urs Stäheli advocates a two-fold definition of popularity 
that is context-specific: if the attribute »popular« is attached to a person (i.e. in a »system of 
interaction«), the meaning of »well-liked« becomes the decisive one and the term »popular« 
is perceived as positive.31 In a »functional system« however, e.g. in science or in the arts, the 
term »popular« is perceived as negative, or at least ambivalent. 
<20> 
Apart from these exceptional examples, a lot more texts have been published since the end 
of the 1980s that deal with popularity or popular culture, but most of them adopt one of the 
already existing narrower definitions. For instance, a definition based on characteristic 
qualities, or quality in general, is used (partially) in a dissertation by Monika Bloß from 
1989,32 an essay by Jens Ruchatz from 2005,33 and a book by Hans-Otto Hügel from 2007,34 
among others. An example for a discussion of a class-based definition is Sabine Haupt's 
essay from 1999.35 The political tradition is continued (and discussed critically) in a book by 
John Frow from 2005,36 for instance. There are fewer examples for definitions based on 
individual reception, like the one by Roger Chartier, but Lawrence Grossberg's approach to  
popularity and popular culture might be one of them. Grossberg identifies taste as the driving 
force behind the creation of popularity,37 and describes »fandom« as a popularity-specific 
kind of reception, which is characterized by affective relations such as »volitional power«, 
»mood«, »investment« and »energization«.38 
<21> 
By and large, many of these different positions are summed up quite accurately in a 
reference work entry by John Hartley from 1994, in which he says, »it [the term ›popular‹] still 
retains sufficient traces of its history to be a multi-accentual term: the popularity of something 
may be taken either as an indication of its positive or of its negative value, depending on your 
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alignment to ›the people‹. Thus the concept is not exempt from politics […].«39 Hartley 
doesn't fail to mention the distinction between popular and high culture, the question of 
quality, and the role of popular culture within the class struggle either. So is it safe to say that 
there is a consensus on the definition of popularity in the scholarly discourse, or at least on a 
certain range of definitions that we call the narrower ones? Not quite. The broader definition 
of popularity, »well-liked by many people«, has always been in use. An early example is a 
text by George Henry Lewes from 1865, which is particularly interesting because it stresses 
the emotional aspect (»well-liked«) of the definition, which is often neglected, and the broad 
definition thus often rejected as »merely quantitative« by others. According to Lewes, 
<22> 
»the reward [of the writer] is not always measurable by the number of copies sold; that 
simply measures the extent of his public. [...] The real reward of Literature is in the sympathy 
of congenial minds, and is precious in proportion to the elevation of those minds, and the 
gravity with which such sympathy moves […]. The novel and the drama, by reason of their 
commanding influence over a large audience, often seduce writers to forsake the path on 
which they could labor with some success, but on which they know that only a small 
audience can be found; as if it were quantity more than quality, noise rather than 
appreciation, which their mistaken desires sought.«40 
<23> 
Granted, Lewes does not explicitly say anything about ›popularity‹. But his »success«, which 
is the topic of his essay, can be equated with popularity in the broad sense. Lewes says, »we 
must always ask, What is the nature of the applause, and from what circles does it rise?«, 
but by that he means we have to determine whether a work of art really enjoys popularity in 
the sense of honest and lasting appreciation.41 He doesn't divide the audience according to 
social classes, and rejects the opinion »that the public taste is degraded and prefers trash«. 
Neither does he distinguish between works of high quality and works that are widely read 
and appreciated. He always writes about »Literature« with a capital L, and his theory is that 
the success of a book is determined by the qualities of »Vision«, »Sincerity« and »Beauty«.42 
A more recent example of a broad definition of popularity is the proposition of Alan B. Farmer 
and Zachary Lesser to derive measures of popularity (or, to be more precise and to use their 
term, different »structures of popularity«) of books from »both total number of editions and 
frequency of reprinting, as well as market share and profitability.«43 
<24> 
However, scholarly texts using the broad popularity definition are not only rare, but they also 
rarely reflect upon their use of the term or theorize it. An exception is Harold E. Hinds, Jr., 
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who believes popularity to be measurable, and in fact says, »if attention to popularity may be 
necessary for building theories and methodologies unique to popular culture studies, then 
popular culture scholarship should incorporate estimates of popularity«.44 Popular culture 
scholarship as a discipline is of no concern for us here, but it is interesting to see that Hinds 
rejects all theories that claim that different aesthetic traits separate »elite« from »popular« 
works of art, and that he advocates the use of »empirical research« to determine »degrees of 
popularity«. On the other hand, the broad definition of popularity is often attacked by 
advocates of a narrow one. For instance, Jim McGuigan »discards« the definition »well-liked 
by many people« »easily enough«, because it is »merely a quantitative observation, not a 
concept«.45 Another reason to discard the broad definition is that »forms which would not 
usually be considered popular have large numbers of admirers, such as grand opera.« 
Similar statements have been made by David Novitz (»The philosopher who thinks of a Mark 
Rothko painting as an instance of popular art, and who theorizes accordingly, will not be 
taken seriously.«)46 and Theodore Gracyk (»Andy Warhol’s pop art, Monet’s paintings of his 
garden at Giverny, and Puccini’s operas are accessible art, too. Yet we do not classify them 
as popular art«).47 A third argument against the broad definition is that it is »too broad and 
inclusive« (Gracyk). »Where do you draw the line?«, asks McGuigan, and Novitz even says, 
»we are forced to draw the distinction because of the different roles that popular and high art 
play in our lives.« 
<25> 
I reject all three of these arguments against the broad definition of popularity as insubstantial 
and invalid, and I will now explain why. When Jim McGuigan says, »well-liked by many 
people« is a »quantitative observation« and therefore »not a concept«, I wonder what his 
concept of a ›concept‹ is. Why can't a concept be quantifiable? There are indeed concepts 
that may be hard to quantify, like the concept of beauty, for instance. But what about the 
concept of value, or the concept of age? They, as well as a lot of other properties of works of 
art,48 can be measured. So can popularity be measured, too? I believe that at least relative 
statements about the popularity of a work of art can be made (›object A is more popular than 
object B‹). If that disqualifies popularity in the broader sense as a ›concept‹, I do not care 
much, but in any case it is a term theorized through texts like this one and others. That 
qualifies it for use within a scholarly context. To discard a concept as quantitative tells 
probably more about a certain unease of many arts and humanities scholars towards working 
with numbers, than about its scholarly validity. Besides, the observation »well-liked by many 
people« is not »merely quantitative« - at least it is not directly quantifiable. We can (though 
usually not without difficulties) quantify the people that have perceived a certain object, that 
is, the »by many people« part of the definition. But what about the »well-liked« part? Surely, 
to read a book and to like it is often enough two different things. Whether someone likes a 
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work of art, and how much he or she does, could be determined only indirectly, e.g. by 
questionnaire surveys, and thus quantified. But ultimately, the measurement of emotions can 
only be a rough approximation. (For most scholars, though, the act of reception is proof 
enough that the object is liked, and they equal higher television ratings or a higher number of 
copies sold with a higher degree of popularity, etc.) This shows that the broad definition can 
only partially be called »quantitative«. 
<26> 
As a second argument, McGuigan, Novitz and Gracyk list works of art that »would not 
usually be considered popular«. Here, it becomes important to look at the precise wording. 
So far, I have treated »popularity«, »popular«, »the popular«, »popular culture«, »popular 
art«, »popular literature« etc. all as largely equivalent. This was valid when discussing the 
different definitions, but it is important to note now that McGuigan, Novitz and Gracyk do not 
say, ›no statements can be made about the popularity of grand opera or Mark Rothko 
paintings‹. Instead, what I think that these three authors want to say is most clearly 
expressed in the wording of Gracyk: »[...] do not classify as popular art«. For Gracyk, and, I 
believe, also the other two authors, and many of the other advocates of a narrow popularity 
definition as well, popularity is a matter of classification. For them, an object either belongs to 
the class of popular culture, or to high culture/fine art. There's (usually) nothing in between, 
and an object cannot belong to both spheres. So, to call an object ›popular‹ is to assign it to 
the sphere of popularity, and to withdraw it from the other sphere. This, however, is not how I 
would like the term ›popular‹ to be used. I see ›popular‹ as an adjective that can express 
popularity in a variety of degrees (including lack thereof with its antonym, ›unpopular‹). In this 
sense, to call an object ›popular‹ doesn't say much unless it is further specified, e.g. used 
relatively to compare the degree of popularity of several objects. Can a painting be called 
›popular‹? Novitz and Gracyk would probably say no, whereas Fritz Novotny, who wrote an 
article on »the popularity of van Gogh«,49 would probably say yes. But the statement that a 
certain painting is popular wouldn't have much meaning in itself. It would make more sense 
to say, for instance, »van Gogh's Starry Night is more popular than Rothko's Red, White and 
Brown«, or »the popularity of van Gogh's paintings has increased after his death«. I believe 
that all works of art have a popularity. This can also be a very low one, or even a negative 
one. A negative popularity can either mean ›well-liked by few‹, or ›disliked by many‹, or even 
›disliked by few and unknown to others‹. A recent example for an object that is well-known, 
but not generally liked, is the film Meet the Spartans from 2008 by Jason Friedberg and 
Aaron Seltzer. The film was seen by millions of people, and can be considered a commercial 
success.50 However, it received overwhelmingly negative reviews from both professional 
critics and normal filmgoers: according to the meta-review website Rotten Tomatoes, only 
2% of the reviews were positive,51 and in The Internet Movie Database, it was ranked one of 
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the 100 worst films of all time through the votes of more than 47,000 users.52 It is hard to 
compare the degree of popularity of Meet the Spartans to a film that was received positively, 
but only by a small audience, although it would be perfectly valid to compare it to that of 
other high-grossing films, or of films that were received similarly negatively. 
<27> 
The third argument against the broad definition of popularity is that, according to Gracyk, it is 
»too inclusive« if it allows both Old Master paintings and Hollywood films to be called 
»popular art«. This argument, again, stems from the notion of ›popular‹ as a category. Within 
a classification system, it would indeed be desirable to design classes of similar sizes. If 
›popular art‹/›popular culture‹ on one hand and ›fine art‹/›high culture‹ on the other are 
considered two classes within the same hierarchical level of a classification, then they should 
contain roughly the same number of elements, and there shouldn't be any overlap between 
the two. This would be a problem, as Gracyk and others fear, because the ›popular art‹ class 
would contain so many elements that it would largely absorb the ›fine art‹ class. However, 
we do not think of ›popular‹ as a sensible category within a classification.53 There are several 
other terms, such as ›art‹ or ›culture‹, whose common definitions are also broad, and overlap 
with each other and other concepts. Should they be disregarded as concepts too, because 
they are too inclusive? Wouldn't it make more sense to use these terms as properties that all 
can exist in one and the same work of art simultaneously, to a greater or lesser extent?54 
Using the terms in this way, van Gogh's Starry Night can be described both as ›popular‹ and 
as ›fine art‹ in a high degree, whereas Meet the Spartans can also be validly described as 
popular and as art, but in a low degree. David Novitz says that »we are forced to draw the 
distinction because of the different roles that popular and high art play in our lives.« Are we 
really? Certainly it is dangerous to confuse the status of different objects. For example, it 
would not be wise, financially, to think that the (average) value of a painting by van Gogh 
would be equal to that of a painting by Norman Rockwell. There might be several reasons 
why a van Gogh painting is valued more than a Rockwell painting, but the reason is not that 
the van Gogh is fine art and the Rockwell isn't. Van Gogh's paintings are more typical of fine 
art, because they were conceived as autonomous products, whereas Rockwell's paintings 
were usually used as advertisement illustrations. So van Gogh may be an artist in a higher 
degree than Rockwell, but that doesn't mean we have to place them in two completely 
separate categories. Novitz may even be right when he says that it's important to be able to 
tell a great, unique work of art apart from a shoddy mass-produced object in everyday life. 
But I believe he is wrong if he says the difference is in the popularity, and that only one of the 
two may be called ›popular‹. 
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<28> 
It may now seem as if, because I advocate the use of the broader definition of popularity, I 
reject all narrower perspectives I have presented in this article. But that is not the case. I do 
want other scholars to engage with the popularity of works of art in the way I suggested: to 
apply the concept of popularity to any work of art whenever it seems worthwhile. But I do 
also acknowledge that it is interesting, useful and important to study the reception behavior 
of different social classes. It is important to study differences in quality among different kinds 
of objects. It is important to identify characteristic intrinsic properties of different kinds of art. 
It is important to examine the role of cultural objects and their reception in social conflicts. 
And it is important to analyze the different ways in which an object can be perceived. The 
only thing I reject is the attitude that there is but one single correct way to study the 
phenomenon of popularity. 
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